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 Abstract 
This paper explores how banks specialize into different 
activities when they start with differing comparative advantages 
in some industry or geographic area or product. The possibility 
of coordination failure, i.e. wrong specialization is highlighted 
with risk neutral financial intermediaries. Mechanisms for 
eliminating the coordination failure are discussed. Too much 
diversification takes place with risk averse financial 
intermediaries and is shown to be mitigated by financial 
innovation in banking like credit derivatives and securitization.  
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 1.   Introduction 
In this paper, the focus shifts on the following question: how do banks compete 
when they have comparative advantage in different areas (like products and 
services, industry groups, geographical areas etc.)? As it turns out, the answers are 
not trivial and have important welfare implications. Before we explore the above 
question formally, it is useful to relate the question to the extant theory of 
industrial organization as applied to the theory of financial intermediation. The 
usage of monopolistic competition framework is a more acceptable resolution to 
the extremities predicted by the Bertrand Framework (another example is of 
course, the capacity and price competition model of Kreps-Scheinkman (1983). 
Financial Intermediaries do compete in terms of product or service differentiation, 
and a number of authors have tried to examine different regulatory issues in 
banking using the concept of the locational Salop circle model (Salop (1979)). 
However, the equilibria of these models are symmetric and nothing would change 
if banks reversed their positions. To break away from this paradox we need bank 
specific characteristics that determine why different banks finance different types 
of business. Different degrees of increasing returns in financing different 
industries could be one factor: bank A may face increasing return in lending to 
firm X while bank B may have it over firm Y. But while the presence of 
increasing returns in monitoring, screening and lending could be a sufficient 
condition, the necessary condition turns out to be comparative advantage. While it 
is true, that sometimes expertise evolve endogenously, it is also equally true that 
certain intrinsic characteristics of financial intermediaries, and their clients and 
regions where they serve, lead to differences in cost patterns and create absolute 
and comparative advantages. For example, in wholesale and corporate banking, 
domestic banks typically have a great of advantage over foreign banks due to their 
intimate relationship with depositors and industries and knowledge of domestic 
and local industrial and market conditions. On the other hand, due to the 
information technology and communications revolution, foreign banks find it 
relatively easy to profitably penetrate a new retail market provided it is growing. 
Thus, one can surmise, that, foreign banks may have comparative advantage in 
retail banking sector of an emerging market country, though they would have less 
of a chance in the wholesale banking market. Similarly, community and regional 
banks find it difficult to penetrate across regions with different cultures and 
communities since business mobilization depends on cultural networks for these 
banks. Thus they develop comparative advantage in serving a specified 
community or a geographic region (of course merger waves can lead to inter-
regional consolidation for them later on in their evolutionary path, but that is a 
different story). The question is whether the allocation of resources by the 
banking system is efficient, and reflects this kind of intrinsic comparative 
advantage patterns? As we shall see, they need not be and may very well require 
regulatory intervention of different kinds.  
 
The existing literature on financial intermediation provides strong reasons why 
banks should be diversified. On the liabilities side, banks should have a 
diversified set of depositors with different withdrawal patterns such that by 
utilizing the law of large numbers a bank can predict efficiently the withdrawal 
demand at any point in time and thus minimize the risk of costly bank runs 
(Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). On the asset side, portfolio diversification directly 
follows from risk aversion on the part of the financial intermediaries under 
incomplete markets. Hellwig (2000) studies financial intermediation under risk 
aversion in the context of the model of delegated monitoring of Diamond (1984) 
and shows the viability of financial intermediation and a pattern of risk allocation 
where risk is shifted from borrowers to banks and / or depositors. Limited liability 
and / or diminishing returns of borrowers could be additional reasons and could 
lead to asset diversification even with risk neutral banks.  However, there are 
pitfalls to diversifying too much as well. As Winton (1997, 1999) has pointed out, 
when banks keep diversifying their portfolios, the ability to monitor the new or 
the marginal borrowers may fall, and there also might be a disincentive to monitor 
in general, leading to possibilities of accumulation of bad debt and even bank 
collapse. Some papers have examined the diversification motives of financial 
intermediaries under competition but most of them assume that different loan 
return distribution are uncorrelated and diversification increase with bank size. 
Yosha (1997) analyzes diversification and competition in a large Cournot-Walras 
economy, and Winton (1997) examine competition among financial 
intermediaries where diversification matters. Shaffer (1994) identifies conditions 
where pooling or diversification increase failure probability. 
 
Here we start with a simple model of comparative advantage and Cournot 
competition in banking and extend the model to show how inefficiency can arise 
in the course of strategic competition and different solutions to those 
inefficiencies. Here we assume that banking regulator’s task is to ensure 
maximizing surplus or efficiency in the banking industry.  
 
2. A Simple Cournot Model of Specialization 
There are two banks A and B. Each has one unit of loanable funds whose cost is 
normalized to zero (We are not considering explicitly the competition for inputs 
like deposits and capital between the banks but focusing only on the credit 
market. Extensions along those lines will not change the analysis qualitatively as 
will be clear from the argument below.). There are two industrial sectors that 
borrow from the two banks. Total amount lent to the jth sector by the ith bank is 
qij (where i =A,B indicate the banks and j = 1,2 denote the industries) and the 
resource constraint for the ith bank is ∑j qij = 1 for all i. 
 
Demand Function for each sector is Pj = α - β Qj            (2.1) 
where j ∈ [1, 2] , 
and Qj = qAj + qBj                (2.2) 
 
The marginal management cost (which includes cost of screening, monitoring 
etc.) of lending to each sector for each bank is mij. This cost is assumed to be 
constant but one could generalize to the case of falling costs or increasing returns. 
Assumption 2.1 :  mA1   <  mB1   and mA2   >  mB2. Thus each bank has a absolute 
and comparative advantage in lending to one sector. Further, cost differences are 
such that (mA2  - mA1 ) > 3 β and if (mB1  - mB2 ) > 3 β 
 
The objective function for bank A is (the case for B is symmetric) :  
∏A = [ {α - β (qA1 + qB1) - mA1  } qA1] + [ {α - β (qA2 + qB2) - mA2 } qA2] 
The optimization problem is such that  
Max ∏A = [ {α - β (qA1 + qB1) - mA1  } qA1] + [ {α - β (qA2 + qB2) - mA2 } qA2] 
w.r.t. qA1 , qA2 
s.t. qA1 + qA2 = 1. 
0 ≤ qA1 ≤ 1 
0 ≤ qA2 ≤ 1 
Proposition 2.1: The optimal quantity choices in the Cournot equilibrum are 
qA*1 = 1 and qB*1  = 0  
Proof : We prove the case of bank A, that of B is symmetric.  
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for bank A in this optimization problem are as 
follows : 
{α - β (2qA1 + qB1) - mA1 } - [α - β {2 (1- qA1) - (1 - qB1) } - mA2] ≤ 0 and qA1  = 0  
               (2.3) 
or, 
{α - β (2qA1 + qB1) - mA1 } - [α - β {2 (1- qA1) - (1 - qB1) } - mA2] ≥ 0 and qA1 = 1  
               (2.4) 
(note that the second order condition is satisfied) 
 Now, the left hand side of the first order conditions is: 
{α - β (2qA1 + qB1) - mA1 } - [α - β {2 (1- qA1) + (1 - qB1) } - mA2] 
= - 4 β qA1 – 2 β qB1 + (mA2  - mA1 ) + 3 β             (2.5) 
 
> (mA2  - mB1 ) - 6 β + 3 β  = (mA2  - mB1 ) - 3 β > 0 , so qA1 = 1 
Similarly, for bank B.                                                                               Q.E.D. 
 
Therefore, there will be dominant strategy Cournot-Nash solution with strategic 
specialization and no diversification by banks provided the above conditions are 
satisfied. Are they the efficient solution too? Yes, because banking industry 
profits are maximized from strategic specialization (the first order conditions are 
same). Note that the assumption 3.1 ensures that the dominant strategy is the 
Counot-Nash equilibrium. For low cost differences, dominant strategy 
equilibrium will not hold and banks will diversify. While such a possibility should 
be borne in mind, here the emphasis is on depicting the basic pattern of 
specialization as a result of comparative advantages. This is a useful benchmark 
in the sense that  
(a) One would be interested to know if there exist situations where banks can 
specialize in the wrong area and the equilibrium is inefficient, and if so, what are 
the possible remedies and  
(b)  What happens when risk aversion comes into play and creates tradeoffs 
between specialization and diversification. 
 3. Coordination Problem in a Discrete Choice Model 
Now consider the same Cournot model with the added assumption: 
Assumption 3.1: Minimum investment in each sector by a bank is one unit. 
 
This introduces a non-convexity into the optimization problem of each bank. 
Now the game becomes a one shot discrete choice game with strategy sets and 
payoff matrix of the following form: 
 
Table 1: The Normal Form Cournot game with nonconvexity 
Strategies 
A to Invest in 
Sector 1 
A to Invest in 
sector 2 
B to Invest in 
Sector 1 
ΠA = [ α - β2 ] - [mA1] , 
ΠB = [ α - β2 ] - [mB1] . 
ΠA = [ α - β ] - [mA2] , 
ΠB = [ α - β ] - [mB1] . 
B to Invest in 
Sector 2 
ΠA = [ α - β ] - [mA1] , 
ΠB = [ α - β] - [mB2] . 
ΠA = [ α - β2 ] - [mA2] , 
ΠB = [ α - β2 ] - [mB2] . 
 
There exist two equilibria: in the first one, banks specialize in the industry where 
they have comparative advantage; in the second, banks specialize where they have 
comparative disadvantage. The second equilibrium arises because of the 
following reason: if bank A decides to specialize in industry 2, then bank B can 
get monopoly profit by choosing to specialize in industry 1 whereas it would only 
get Cournot profit (although a greater relative share due to the comparative 
advantage). If the monopoly effect is sufficiently high, then it pays for bank B to 
forego its comparative advantage factor.  
 
The equilibria, moreover, are Pareto ranked, since the intermediation efficiency 
and borrower welfare are higher when banks specialize according to their 
comparative advantage. So in this case, if government could induce the selection 
of the better equilibrium, the intervention could be clearly justified. However, it is 
not quite clear how the government could exactly intervene. One possible way is 
to restrict entry into specialization through licensing. The Regulator can charge a 
license fee in such a way that a bank would buy a license for doing business with 
a particular industry only when it has a comparative advantage in that industry.  
 
Consider the following mechanism: A fee F is charged on (a) bank A entering 
industry 2 and (b) bank B entering industry 1 such that the following conditions 
hold: 
[ α - β2
 
] - [mA1] > [ α - β - mA2 ] – F            (4.3.1) 
[ α - β2
 
] - [mB2] > [ α - β  - mB1] – F            (4.3.2) 
Therefore, even if A has the strategy to specialize in industry 2, bank B still finds 
it optimal to invest in industry 2. Thus choosing industry 2 becomes a dominant 
strategy for bank B. Similarly, choosing industry 1 becomes a dominant strategy 
for bank A. Thus we get to the pareto efficient equilibrium.  
The matrix below shows the normal form of the game with changed payoffs. 
Table 2: Cournot Game with entry fee 
Strategies A to Invest in 
Sector 1 
A to Invest in 
sector 2 
B to Invest in 
Sector 1 
ΠA = α - β2 - mA1 
ΠB = α - β2 - mB1 - F 
ΠA = α - β - mA2  - F 
ΠB = α - β - mB1 - F 
B to Invest in 
Sector 2 
ΠA = α - β  - mA1  
ΠB = α - β - mA2 
ΠA = α - β2 - mA1 - F 
ΠB = α - β2 - mB1 
 
 
However, in reality, a license fee arrangement of this type in the banking industry 
would be difficult to implement optimally because of two kind of constraints: 
i) Informational constraints – Suppose that costs are private information of 
the banks and the Social Planner or the Banking Regulator does not know the 
costs or comparative advantage of banks sufficiently well to choose an optimal 
fee. When comparative advantage is slight relative to the monopoly effect, the 
actual fee may turn out to be too low to create the efficient dominant strategy 
equilibrium. On the other hand, if comparative advantage is too high, a high fee 
may create excess burden and turn out to be suboptimal. 
ii)  Corruption - Now consider a corrupt regulator: it will try to create a 
monopoly because it can extract a higher surplus from the monopoly arrangement 
than the competitive arrangement. Although the coordination failure may not 
occur because of high fees (so that comparative advantage dominates), welfare 
falls compared to the case without regulation and intervention. 
 So, the above constraints, when they are present, warrant a different mode of 
resolution, other than regulatory intervention (except possibly, when the honest 
regulator can screen effectively to mitigate informational problems or the 
corruption of the regulator can be monitored and neutralized effectively). One 
mechanism is a cooperative game of communication and binding commitments 
preceding the stage of investment. Clearly, the Pareto inefficient will not be 
chosen in this case, but the theorist has to worry about the efficiency with which 
communication can take place and regarding the enforceability of binding 
commitments.  Introducing complexity and generalizing this simple two by two 
one shot game with respect to number of players, private and public information, 
the mode of communication, agency and organization factors in banking etc. may 
further add to the coordination problem. For example, suppose the manager of 
Bank A has a deal with the industry 2 that it will charge less than the monopoly 
price to the industry in return for a bribe. Similarly, in the case of a deal between 
the manager of bank B and industry 1. Clearly, the two managers will negotiate to 
get into the wrong equilibrium in the absence of a proper incentive mechanism 
within the banks.  
 
The equilibrium selection problem vanishes if instead of a one shot game, we 
change the timing of moves to make this a sequential move game. Consider the 
following assumption: 
Assumption 3.1: One bank moves at a time. Nature selects which bank will move 
first.  
 
It is immediately obvious that, irrespective of who moves first, the Pareto efficient 
equilibrium will be chosen. If the monopoly effect dominates, the second mover 
will choose the residual industry. In that case the first mover will find it a 
dominant strategy to select the industry where it has comparative advantage. 
Obviously, the same equilibrium will materialize when the comparative advantage 
effect dominates. Note however, that if the agency problem mentioned above is 
present, the bad equilibrium will be chosen by the managers by virtue of their 
decision making powers.  
 
To conclude, in our simple setup, the coordination problem can be resolved 
through the following mechanisms: 
 An industry access license fee arrangement imposed on the banks 
 Binding commitments 
 Sequential moves 
The efficiency of these mechanisms are of course, subject to the fact, that 
information and agency problems in private and public sector are not present or 
can be suitably neutralized without creating further strategic distortions, and also 
that, in more complex games, the mode of communication will allow binding 
commitments and the mechanism for eliciting or revealing information will be 
effective. It is interesting to note that De Palma and Gary-Bobo (1996) have 
reported a similar coordination failure in the context of Cournot competition. 
Their mechanism is to bring in liquidation costs to generate non-concavities in the 
bank’s objective functions. The non-convexity in the present model is basically 
technological in nature. Further, the present model is concerned about 
coordination failure in the pattern of specialization rather than looking at 
possibility of coordination failure in the context of a model with homogenous 
bank clients. Therefore the present model and the De Palma and Gary-Bobo 
model should be seen as complementary ones.  
 
4.  Risk Averse Intermediaries  
Now suppose that banks are risk averse and maximize expected utilities of profits 
rather than expected profits. The utility function is represented as one of mean-
variance tradeoff function. The assumption of risk averse intermediaries come 
from the fact that shareholders of banks cannot perfectly diversify away risk since 
the market for such risk sharing (through multiple ownership of banks by a single 
shareholder) is essentially incomplete. 
 
The noise that creates risk is assumed to come from demand that has an additive 
stochastic element for each industry. Further, let us assume that demands in the 
two industrial sectors are negatively correlated. We assume the following: 
E(εj) = 0, σ21 = σ22 = σ2  and σ12 < 0             (4.1) 
The demand function is: 
Pj = α - β Qj  + εj               (4.2) 
where j ∈ [1, 2] and  
Qj = qAj + qBj                 (4.3) 
The objective function of bank A is : 
Max UA = E( ∏A )– (1/2) ψVar( ∏A ) = 
E ( [{α - β (qA1 + qB1) + ε1 }- mA1  ] qA1 + [{α - β (1- qA1 + qB2) + ε2 } - mA1  ] (1 - 
qA1) ) 
- (1/2) ψVar [{α - β (qA1 + qB1) + ε1 }- mA1  ] qA1 + [{α - β (1- qA1 + qB2) + ε2 } - 
m
A
1  ] (1 - qA1) )  
(where it is assumed that ψ = 2 to simplify the analysis) 
= E [{α - β (qA1 + qB1) + ε1 }- mA1  ] qA1 + [{α - β (1- qA1 + qB2) + ε2 } - mA1  ] (1 - 
qA1) ) - E [qA1 {ε1 - E(ε1)}+ (1 - qA1) {ε2 - E(ε2)}]2 
 
The First Order Condition is: 
[{α - β (2qA1 + qB1) + ε1 }  - mA1 ] - [{α - β ((-2qA1 + 2) + 1- qB1) + ε2 } 
 
- mA2  ] – 2qA1E {ε1 - E(ε1)}2  + (2- 2qA1 ) E{ε2 - E(ε2)2 - 2 (1- 2qA1)E {ε1 - E(ε1)} 
E{ε2 - E(ε2)} = 0              (4.4) 
or qA1(- 4 β - 4σ2 - 4σ12) + (2 β  + 2σ2 + 2σ12 ) - 4σ12   
= 2β qB1 + (mA1 - mA2) – 1 
In a symmetric equilibrium qA1 = 1 - qB1  
or qA1(- 4 β - 4σ2 - 4σ12) + (2 β  + 2σ2 + 2σ12 ) - 4σ12   
= 2β (1 - qA1) + (mA1 - mA2) – 1  
or qA1(- 2 β - 4σ2 - 4σ12) + ( β  + 2σ2 + 2σ12 ) - 4σ12   
= β 
 
+ (mA1 - mA2) – 1 
or qA1 = [{ β + (mA1 - mA2) – 1} / (- 2 β - 4σ2 - 4σ12) ]  
+ 4σ12  / (- 2 β - 4σ2 - 4σ12)   –  (1 / 2)                   (4.5) 
 
There are three terms on the right hand side and it has to be established how each 
of them behaves with changes in the stochastic parameters.  
 
First we take the first term and determine the sign of the numerator. Recall from 
our earlier assumption 4.2.1 that 3β - (mA2  - mA1 ) < 0 which implies that the 
numerator term: β - (mA2  - mA1 ) –1 <  3β - (mA2  - mA1 ) < 0.  Therefore, the first 
term will have a lower value if variance increases and a higher value if the 
covariance increases. 
 
With respect to the second term, the numerator is negative since industry demand 
functions are negatively correlated. One can see that as variance increases the 
degree of specialization falls and it increases (falls) with an increase (fall) in 
covariance of the noise terms between the two sectors  
 
The last term is a constant and therefore invariant with respect to the degree of 
specialization.  
 
Therefore, with an increase in variance, banks tend towards greater diversification 
and with an increase in covariance the tendency is towards more specialization 
(The solution for bank B is symmetric and the conclusions are similar).  
 
What one observes here is basically that due to risk aversion and negative 
correlation between the two sectors, diversification is preferred to specialization 
in the Cournot equilibrium even though each bank has a comparative advantage in 
one industry. The result would be different if there existed market for Credit 
Derivatives and Securitization so that banks could specialize in accordance with 
their comparative advantages and also, hedge against the risk of specialization 
(overexposure in some sectors) at the same time. It is obvious that efficiency 
gains exist with such instruments and markets. The next section discusses in brief 
these credit derivative instruments and how they can improve efficiency in the 
context of strategic competition. 
 
5.  Credit Derivatives and Securitization 
5.1 Credit Derivatives 
Credit Derivatives are financial instruments used to transfer credit risk of loans 
and other assets. There are various types: the basic categories are options, 
forwards and swaps. Due to their high flexibility credit derivatives can be 
structured according to the end-user’s needs. For instance, the transfer of credit 
risk can be done for the whole life of the underlying asset or for a shorter period, 
and the transfer can be a complete or a partial one. Delivery can take place in the 
form of over the counter contracts or embedded in notes. Moreover, the 
underlying can consist of a single credit sensitive asset or a pool of credit 
sensitive assets. 
 
The market for credit derivatives arose during the early 1990s and is apparently 
developing quickly, as measured by both increasing activity and declining 
spreads. So far, the most commonly transacted forms of credit derivatives have so 
far been credit default swaps, total return swaps, and credit default linked notes.  
 
The credit default swap is an agreement in which one counterparty (the protection 
buyer) pays a periodic fee, typically expressed in fixed basis points, on the 
notional amount, in return for a contingent payment by the other counter party 
(the protection seller) in the event of default of the underlying. A default is strictly 
defined in the contract to include, for example, bankruptcy, insolvency, and / or 
payment default. The contingent payment can be defined as either  
• A payment of par by the protection seller in exchange for physical 
delivery of the defaulted underlying 
• A payment of par less the recovery value of the underlying as determined 
by a dealer poll 
• A payment of a binary or a fixed amount. 
 
Credit default swaps can be viewed as an insurance against the default of the 
underlying or as a put option on the underlying. 
 The total return swap is an agreement in which one counterparty (total return 
payer) pays the other counterparty (total return receiver) the total return of the 
underlying, while the total return payer receives a Libor (London Interbank Rate) 
related amount in return. In contrast to the credit default swap, it does not only 
transfer the credit risk but also the market risk of the underlying. 
 
In this context the credit banks can use credit derivatives strategically. Bank A 
can swap part of its revenue from industry from 1 in exchange for part of the 
revenue accruing to bank B from industry 2. Since the two industries are 
negatively correlated, this obviates the need for portfolio diversification by banks 
and enables them to specialize in their core (comparative advantage) areas. 
Consider the following discrete choice game between banks which tradeoff risk 
and return and therefore have a mean-variance objective function as in the last 
section. This is illustrated in the table below:  
Table 3: A Portfolio Game between risk averse Intermediaries 
 Strategy B2(1) Strategy B2(2) 
Strategy B1(1) M + x – V - y  
Strategy B1(2)  M - V 
 
The table depicts the normal form of the game. Strategies of bank 1 are shown 
along the rows and that of bank 2 are shown along the columns. The cells show 
common payoffs. Note that when a pair of strategies is incompatible, such as the 
off diagonal ones in the cell, then no payoffs are applicable.  
 
Strategy B1(1) is the strategy to bank 1 of completely specializing in industry 1 
and swapping half of it’s net revenue for half of net revenue of bank 2 from 
industry 2 where bank 2 has completely specialized. The strategy is inoperative if 
bank 2 has a different lending pattern or does not agree to the swap. Strategy 
B2(1) is the strategy to bank 2 of completely specializing in industry 2 and 
swapping half of it’s net revenue for half of net revenue of bank 1 from industry 1 
where bank 1 has completely specialized. The strategy is inoperative if bank 1 has 
a different lending pattern or does not agree to the swap. Strategy B1(2) is the 
(only) other option of bank 1 of lending equally to the two industries and thus 
hold a diversified portfolio. Similarly Strategy B2(2) is the (only) other option of 
bank 2 of lending equally to the two industries and thus hold a diversified 
portfolio. 
 
Now, when the bank 1 plays B1(2) and bank 2 plays B2(2)), Cournot competition 
implies mean return (denoted by M) is low compared to monopoly. Let the 
variance to each bank in the case of bank 1 playing B1(2) and bank 2 playing 
B2(2) be denoted as V. As opposed to this, when banks play their first strategies, 
they get a higher return not only due to monopoly effect but also due higher 
returns from specializing completely in their comparative advantage. Let us 
assume this difference is x. However, although in both cases banks are 
diversified, the variance goes up with mean return. Let us denote this increase in 
variance as y. Therefore, when the mean effect (x) is greater than the variance 
effect (y) banks will opt for swapping net cash flows.   
 
The key issue is to find a partner with negatively correlated returns. If it is a over 
the counter market, banks have to basically search for a partner with negative 
correlation and if derivatives take place through an exchange then it is easy for the 
banks to find counterparties for risk sharing. 
 
5.2   Securitization  
The term credit securitization refers to the transformation of illiquid, non- market 
assets into liquid, marketable assets or securities. The development of the credit 
securitization market started in the United States with the securitization of 
mortgage loans in the early 1970s and a significant amount of the volume of such 
derivative securities are still that market. Other markets that use such securities 
are markets for consumer loans, credit card receivables and to an extent the 
market for asset backed securities.  
 
In the first stage of the process the originator pools a number of roughly 
homogenous assets. Them method of pooling in conjunction with the character of 
the asset pool enables a cost efficient analysis of credit risk and the achievement 
of a common payment pattern. In the next stage, the originator sells the assets to a 
Special Purpose Vehicle or SPV that is a trust or a corporation with the sole 
function of supervising the asset. The SPV issues securities in the next stage with 
the help of a Consortium in private placements or a public offering made through 
an investment bank. The payment of interest and principal on the securities is 
directly dependent on the cash flows deriving from the underlying pool of assets. 
A service agent (who frequently is the originator) collects and manages these cash 
flows and a trustee superintends the distribution of the cash flows to the investors. 
The pool of assets is usually provided with some credit enhancement, because 
investors are normally not willing to bear all the credit risk associated with the 
pool. Common forms of credit enhancement are over-collaterization, third party 
insurance, and insurance by the originator. Often different forms of enhancement 
are combined. Additionally the asset backed securities will be rated by a rating 
agency.  
 
The main benefit from asset securitization is that it enables banks to pass the risk 
of lending onto other parties, thus freeing capital resources to back new lending 
which would otherwise be beyond their capacity. The funding and liquidity 
benefits of the securitization process derive from the conversion of illiquid assets 
into liquid funds available for additional lending. Because of the credit 
enhancements, the rating of asset backed securities is often higher than that of the 
originator who is able to tap funding sources not normally available to him. Asset 
securitization also helps banks in their assets and liability management. Interest 
risk can be reduced by passing it onto investors. A bank wishing to extend it’s 
lending but not having funds of adequate maturity can avoid a maturity mismatch 
by securitizing the new loans. Securitization offers a bank heavily exposed to a 
sector or a region an ability to transfer part of it’s loan portfolio and also to 
purchase with the proceeds other types of asset backed securities thus achieving a 
more diversified portfolio.  
 
When a bank finds it difficult to find another bank with which it has a negative 
correlation in sectoral returns, it has to look for outside investors. When there are 
outside investors who hold assets with negative correlation with that of a bank, 
securitization and thus risk sharing is possible for that particular bank. Recourse 
to securitization is particularly useful when the market for credit derivatives is not 
fully developed and is largely over the counter instead of an active exchange 
mediated. 
 
6.   Conclusion 
With risk neutral financial intermediaries playing a Cournot game in the presence 
of comparative advantages, strategic interaction can create coordination problems 
inducing banks to specialize in areas where they do not have comparative 
advantage. Such a situation may warrant a regulatory intervention in the form of 
entry fees subject to the fact that the regulator is not subject to severe 
informational problems or corruption possibilities. Further it should be noted that 
the coordination problem arises due to the nonconvexity in the optimization 
problem and the one shot nature of the Cournot game. In a sequential game the 
problem does not arise. Another potential cause for coordination problem lies in 
the agency problem in banking. 
 
With risk averse financial intermediaries and shocks to demand, diversification 
arises when the two sectors are negatively correlated. A better solution is banks 
specializing in areas where they have comparative advantage but hedging against 
risk of extreme specialization by issuing credit derivatives or securitizing assets. 
Hedging against industry specific risks typically warrant financial innovation by 
banks. As Gale and Hellwig (1994) have shown, financial innovation can have 
large impacts on bank profits and customer welfare. However the financial 
innovation game in banking may exhibit multiple equilibria when network 
externalities are present. This remains a subject for future future. 
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